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Introduction
In the farming business it is crucial to understand the 
decision-making environment and behaviour of farm house-
holds, particularly subsistence smallholders that are often 
exposed to various types of risk and uncertainties. Under-
standing decisions such as the allocation of limited resources 
among a diverse production portfolio requires empirical evi-
dence. Traditionally, Crop Diversification (CD) is regarded 
as a management strategy, particularly in the context of 
subsistence farming, where farmers choose the appropriate 
crop mix to reduce production risks and sustain their live-
lihoods and income. Previous studies have established the 
economic value of CD as an alternative strategy that farm-
ers utilise to enhance productivity and even improve and 
sustain their incomes (Joshi et al., 2007; Kurosaki, 2003; 
Weinberger and Lumpkin, 2007). To respond effectively to 
changing market demand and altering consumption patterns, 
both farmers and agriculture policy makers require a solid 
empirical understanding of the production decision-making 
environment, farmers’ socio-economic characteristics and 
the behaviours that drive decisions regarding crop diversi-
fication. This paper aims to explore farm households’ deci-
sions with regard to the magnitude of crop diversification 
at the farm level in Afghanistan. It analyses the extent of 
diversity in crop production, and the empirical relationship 
between CD and household socio-economic, demographic, 
farm, and farmer characteristics with a key focus on house-
hold off-farm income.
Heterogeneity in farmer crop portfolios under a given set 
of socio-economic circumstances is an important empirical 
discussion. Even in the presence of high-return alternatives 
both on- and off-farm, a large number of farm households 
still engage in producing low yield food commodities 
(mainly staple food grains), and crop portfolio choices vary 
greatly among similar households (Stoeffler, 2016). Hence, 
farmer’s knowledge, technical know-how, and production 
management practices have critical implications for their 
income and costs. This implies that without additional costs, 
there is a great potential for farm households to improve 
their productivity and income simply by adding high value 
crops to their production agenda. In addition, markets for 
particular commodities are imperfect and often fail to facili-
tate the efficient trade of farm produce, forcing farmers to 
adjust their production decisions to compensate for losses 
due to the presence of such market risks. These decisions 
often involve opting for crop or enterprise diversification to 
a lesser or greater extent.
Since emerging out of conflict and the establishment of 
a market-led economy in 2001, Afghanistan’s agricultural 
economy has undergone a drastic policy change, which has 
created opportunities but also posed risks and uncertainties. 
The primary emphasis of Afghanistan’s National Develop-
ment Framework (ANDF) 2009 is to increase productiv-
ity so as to attain food self-sufficiency and increase farm 
incomes at national, regional, and household levels. With 
increased international aid being pledged, Afghanistan’s 
economy grew at a steady rate of  9.4% during 2003-2012 
with a significant  contribution (about 25%) coming from 
the agriculture sector (World Bank, 2014). Economic growth 
has been accompanied by changes in agriculture production 
and consumption patterns, whilst other economic sectors 
(e.g. services and manufacturing industries) have been revi-
talised. With the revitalisation of other sectors and improved 
levels of education, farm households may have had the 
opportunity to diversify into off-farm activities. This high-
lights the importance of understanding the household deci-
sions about labour and resource allocation between on- and 
off-farm activities. 
Current studies on production efficiency find evidence of 
a positive relationship between crop diversification and pro-
duction efficiency in Afghanistan (Ahmadzai, 2017; Tavva 
et al., 2017). Broader research also confirms that CD signifi-
cantly improves farm level efficiency in other countries with 
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a similar socioeconomic context (Coelli and Fleming, 2004; 
Ogundari, 2013; Rahman, 2009). However, Afghanistan’s 
agriculture sector is still highly dominated by production of 
staple food grains (mainly wheat), leaving production sys-
tems highly undiversified. In addition, the decrease in farm 
income among rice/wheat producers in Afghanistan due to 
declining productivity has triggered a change toward farm 
diversification, especially a shift in production from staple 
food crops to higher value commodities (Oushy, 2010). 
Empirical evidence suggests that grain-based production 
systems may not continue to contribute as significantly in 
countries with a policy focus on raising incomes and pro-
duction of high value market crops, generating employment 
opportunities, and alleviating poverty (Joshi et al., 2007). 
This therefore calls for a transformation in agriculture sys-
tems to diversify towards high value crops such as vegeta-
bles and fruits. 
Concept and Measures of Crop 
Diversification
There are two common and complementary approaches 
to crop diversification in agriculture, namely horizontal and 
vertical diversification. Horizontal diversification as a pri-
mary approach to crop diversification, takes place through 
crop intensification by adding new crops to existing pro-
duction line or cropping systems. Vertical diversification 
involves value-added activities such as processing, branding, 
packaging, and other post-harvest activities to enhance the 
marketability of farm product. In the context of this study, 
diversification is defined as a shift in production portfolio 
away from mono-cropping to adopting a multiple cropping 
system. 
The most common method to measure the extent of crop 
diversification is the calculation of a vector of income/rev-
enue shares related to different income sources. While this 
approach puts diversification and income changes directly 
into the relationship, a relevant part of information related 
to different aspects of diversification is neglected such as the 
actual number of crops grown (Asfaw et al., 2018; Barrett 
and Reardon, 2000). The diversity methods that measure 
crop or species richness are usually used in the ecological 
research to capture spatial biodiversity of crops and the rich-
ness of genetic resources. Count measures provide a general 
level of overall diversity on a farm, but do not account for 
whether the farm is growing high value cash crops or staple 
crops and the percentage of resources allocated among dif-
ferent crops (Turner, 2014). 
Given the objective of this study, Composite Entropy 
Index (CEI) was selected as a primary measure for crop 
diversification. In addition to revenue shares of individual 
crops, CEI gives due weighting to the total number of crops 
grown by the farm household. This is important as the rev-
enue share captures the relative importance of crops based 
on their economic value which may largely vary depending 
on the type of crops (i.e. the value of the index will be higher 
for households that grow high value crops). Thus, the CEI 
index is sensitive to the changes in the number of crops and 
their respective revenues. While the CEI index possesses all 
the desirable properties of Entropy and Modified Entropy 
Indices, it is adjusted by the number of crops. The CEI can 
be calculated as: 
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Where Di represents CEI, Pn is the s are of revenue from 
the nth crop (for n = 1, 2, …, N) grown by the ith farmer, 
and  is the number of total crops grown in a given year. The 
computed value of the index increases with level of diversifi-
cation ranging from 0 implying no diversification (i.e. mono-
cropping) to 1 implying the highest level of CD. 
Theoretical Framework and the  
Agriculture Household Model
Farm household decisions pertaining to crop choices 
and the extent of diversification can be best understood in 
the context of the standard farm household model initially 
developed by Singh et al. (1986) which assumes farm 
households are both consumers and producers of agricul-
tural goods operating under a number of constraints. Previ-
ous studies adopted this approach to explore the decision of 
farm households with regard to the intensity of farm or crop 
diversification (Hitayezu et al., 2016; Cavatassi et al., 2012; 
Benin et al., 2004; Van Dusen and Taylor, 2005). 
Proceeding according to the household model, we may 
consider an agricultural house old that maximises utility over 
a set of consumption goods produced on the farm (Cf), a set of 
purchased non-farm commodities (Xnf), and leisure (l). The 
expected utility gained from various combinations and levels 
of consumption goods directly depends on the vector of pref-
erences of the household, denoted by , , , , ( , , )
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, shaped by house-
hold socio-economic, cultural, and other exogenous factors. 
This maximisation problem can be written as:
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Subject to the constraints facing the household:
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The utility is constrained by the general budget constraint 
(Equation 3) such that the maximum expenditures of time 
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w(Lf+Lnf) and money pnf+Cnf cannot exceed the total income 
of a farm household in a given decision-making period. Total 
household income is composed of farm income pf  (Qf -Cf) net 
of production costs C (Qf│
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), and off-farm income denoted 
by Ynf that includes remittances, stocks carried over, and 
other transfers which are exogenous to the crop choices. The 
amount of agriculture produce consumed by the household 
(Cf ) or sold Qf –Cf are chosen from the crop(s) output Qf (for 
crop j =1, 2, 3, … J that household chooses) which is con-
strained by the production technology embedded here in the 
cost function C (Qf│
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 is a vector collecting 
exogenous farm characteristics. Household decisions about 
the number of crops and the quantity is constrained by the 
fixed technology constraint (Equation 4) such that the quan-
tity of goods produced on the farm Qf is a function of pur-
chased inputs (Xf), Labour (Lf ), a given area of land (A) 
which is alloc ted to different crops (here denoted by α or the 
set of share of land allocated between J crops such that 
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According to Benin et al. (2004), each set of area shares 
implies a level or combination of crop outputs, hence the 
objective function in Equation (1) can be re-expressed as: 
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The allocation of labour is constrained by the household total 
labour time (Equation 4) which is denoted by (T) available 
for off-and on-farm activities (denoted by Lf and Lnf ) and 
leisure (l ).
Assuming that households maximise utility and markets 
for farm goods function perfectly, then production decisions 
by farm households can be made separately from the con-
sumption decisions. Thus, the level of crop diversification is 
driven by net returns which are determined by market wage, 
input and output prices (w, px, and pf), and farm physical 
characteristics (
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decisions cannot be separated under imperfect market condi-
tions, then the household optimal choice 
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can be expressed as a reduced form function of land holding 
size, income, and household, farm, and market characteris-
tics. It therefore follows th t: 
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Assum ng that households do not explicitly value crop 
diversification (i.e. it is ot reflected explicitly in the utility 
function itself) and that it is the outcome of choices made in 
a constrained optimisation problem rather than an explicit 
choice (Benin et al., 2004; Van Dusen and Taylor, 2005), 
then crop diversification (D), can be expressed as a derived 
demand function given by:  
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Where D represents diversification measured by compos-
ite entropy index of crop diversity at the household level. 
Equation (9) indicate that crop diversification is a function of 
the initial endowments of labour (L), land (A), exogenous 
non-farm income (Ynf ), farm household characteristics (
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farm characteristics (
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Estimation Strategy
Identification 
In the context of subsistence small-scale agricultural 
systems, farming often fails to provide a sufficient liveli-
hood. Though it may remain a household’s primary source 
of income, such households often seek alternative means of 
income by participating in off-farm activities. This results 
in the reallocation of production resources among on- and 
off-farm. This is consistent with the narrative that allocation 
of farm labour away to off-farm activities decrease diversity 
due to negative labour effects, particularly when the oppor-
tunity cost of household labour is higher than off-farm wages 
under imperfect markets implying non-separability between 
households’ farm profits and off-farm earnings as argued by 
Chavas et al. (2005). Conversely, off-farm income may have 
a positive impact on crop diversity due to the overall income 
effects enabling households to purchase sufficient produc-
tion inputs required for different crops. 
Meanwhile, there might be a third category of unob-
served factors affecting both CD as well as diversification 
towards off-farm activities leading to the endogeneity prob-
lem. Subsistence farmers are typically risk-averse and may 
tend to diversify into both crop diversification and off-farm 
activities. Given that earning additional off-farm income 
might also be used as a diversification strategy by some 
households to spread risk outside the farming sector, one 
would expect the parameter estimate of off-farm income to 
be biased upwards if endogeneity is not accounted for. Other 
examples of these unobserved factors could be the entrepre-
neurial ability and relative efficiency that can influence both 
decisions. In addition, the presence of measurement error 
attributed to the recall of the extent of non-farm income by 
the household (Zereyesus et al., 2017) may cause the coef-
ficient of off-farm income to be biased towards zero. 
The cross-section household level data used in this 
study do not allow to control for unobserved household 
fixed effects, so instrumental variable (IV) techniques are 
employed. Two instruments are used to control for the endo-
geneity bias in off-farm income. Firstly, the share of aggre-
gate off-farm income in the total income for all households 
in a given district. Controlling directly for the household’s 
family labour and regional fixed effects by including house-
hold size and agroecological dummies in the analysis, the 
only pathway for the instrument to influence household deci-
sions is through the household non-farm income activities. 
It is important to note that data in the sample comes from 
349 districts (with 50 farm households on average) and 34 
provinces.  
According to Diiro and Sam (2015), this instrument 
captures the status of local non-farm labour market; higher 
share of non-farm income signifies a high prevalence of non-
farm employment opportunities at a district level which, in 
turn, translates into greater potential for households to diver-
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sify into off-farm activities. Kilic et al. (2009) use share of 
non-farm employment within a district as an instrument for 
off-farm income, noting that, because the instrument is con-
structed at the district level, when regional fixed effects are 
controlled for it is unlikely for the instrument to have a direct 
effect on the farming decisions of households. Smale et al. 
(2016) studied the relationship between off-farm work and 
farm output and used share of total non-farm earnings (busi-
ness and salary) in total income by location as an instrument 
for off-farm income. Gebregziabher et al. (2012) used unem-
ployment rate at the district level to control for potential 
endogeneity in off-farm income. Similarly, in examining the 
relationship between participation in non-agricultural labour 
activities and farm production decisions, Stampini and Davis 
(2009) used a dummy variable for the existence of off-farm 
employment opportunities in the commune. 
Secondly, we use district level lagged values of off-farm 
income from year 2011/12 to instrument for off-farm income. 
Data on lagged off-farm income comes from the same sur-
vey conducted by CSO previously referred to as the National 
Risk & Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA). Off-farm income 
from the past is expected to positively affect farmer’s cur-
rent non-farm activities. Diiro and Sam (2015) uses off-farm 
income from previous years as an instrument to control for 
endogeneity in off-farm income suggesting that income from 
previous years represents an important form of financial 
endowment that assists farm households to invest in produc-
tive farm assets. One might argue the generation of income is 
a dynamic process and that transitory values of past income 
will influence current farming decisions. However, we use 
district level aggregate lagged income (not household level) 
as an instrument to capture the overall non-farm employment 
status. There is also evidence that smallholders are less likely 
to leave cash money on the table to transfer them from one 
season to another (Duflo et al., 2008). 
Econometric Specification
As not every farm household will diversify or choose to 
diversify, a censoring issue underlies the empirical model. 
Although theoretically the dependent variable (CEI) is cen-
sored on both sides because it is bounded by 0 and 1, how-
ever, there are no computed values for CEI that are 1. Since 
the dependent variable is censored at 0 for 33% of the sample 
(i.e. non-diversifiers), conventional regression methods (i.e. 
OLS) fail to account for the qualitative difference between 
zero observations and continuous observations. Zero values 
of the CEI may occur for various reasons. Even though farm-
ers may be potential diversifiers, they may not diversify due 
to constraints such as soil type, climate or farm size. House-
holds may choose to remain non-diversifiers if production 
of certain crops offer a comparative advantage in market or 
production of a particular staple food crop is required for 
food security. In these cases, zero observations represent a 
corner solution which is an optimal choice by the farmers not 
to diversify. Therefore, the zero observations are important 
to be accounted for. 
We employ Cragg’s double hurdle model which is an 
alternative variant of the Tobit model to deal with the zero 
censorship. Cragg’s double hurdle model is more flexible 
than the restrictive Tobit model which allows to estimate 
diversification as an outcome of the two-stage decision pro-
cess (i.e. the first step decision to diversify is governed by a 
Probit model and the second step decision on the extent of 
diversification is modelled by a truncated regression). The 
endogeneity problem in the off-farm income is accounted 
for by employing the instrumental variables through Control 
Function (CF) approach. The CF approach entails that the 
endogenous variable is regressed over the instrumental vari-
ables (IV’s) in the reduced form estimation and subsequently 
generalised residuals from the reduced form estimation are 
estimated and used as an independent variable in the struc-
tural model along with the endogenous variable (Petrin and 
Train, 2010; Wooldridge, 2015). Endogeneity is detected 
if the generalised residual is statistically significant in the 
structural regression. The CF approach is more efficient for 
binary outcome endogenous variables which other instru-
mental variable techniques (such as 2SLS, GMM, IVProbit) 
do not estimate efficiently. CF can also be more efficient 
even for weak instruments (Tadesse and Bahiigwa, 2015; 
Wooldridge, 2007). The reduced form is given by:
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The reduced form model is estimated by regressing the 
endogenous off-farm income Ii over a number of controls Xi 
and instrumental variables. Following Wooldridge (2015), 
the generalized residuals 
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sion are obtained and included in the structural model esti-
mated by the Cragg’s double hurdle model (Cragg, 1971) 
specified as:
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Decision to diversify (11)
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Extent of diversity (12)
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hold’s decision to diversify, 
, , , , ( , , )
( ) ( )
( )
( , , , )
( )
( )
( , , )
( , , , , )
( , , , , , , )
log
ln
ln
max
max
D P P N
N
P P N
P
C C L X A U C C l
p Q C C Q Y
p C w L L
Q f L X A
T L L
Y y L
h V C C l
h h A Y
D D A L Y
I X
y gr I X v
y gr I X
y
if y
if y
and
y if otherwise
y if y and y
1 1
0 0
1 0
0
0 0
* * *
*
*
*
*
*
* *
i n N n
n
N
n
n
N
n
n
f nf
f nf
hh
f f f
f
nf
nf nf f nf
f f
f
f nf
nf nf
nf
f nf
hh
nf
hh f m
nf
hh f nf m
i i i i i
i i i i i i
i i i i i i
i
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
2
2 2 1
2
2 2
;
;
;
;
;
#
a
a
a
a cr b f
a d i b
a d i b f
U
U
U
U
U
U U U
U U U U
=- - =
= -
- - + =
= + +
=
= +
=
=
=
= + + +
= + + + +
= + + + +
=
=
=
=
;
6
6
:
:
D
E D
@
@
(
(
2
2
Z
Z
/
/
 is the latent variable describ-
ing household’s decision on the level of diversification, and 
, , , , ( , , )
( ) ( )
( )
( , , , )
( )
( )
( , , )
( , , , , )
( , , , , , , )
log
ln
ln
max
max
D P P N
N
P P N
P
C C L X A U C l
p Q C C Q Y
p C w L L
Q f L X A
T L L
Y y L
h V C C l
h h A Y
D D A L Y
I X
y gr I X v
y gr I X
y
if y
if y
and
y if otherwise
y if y and y
1 1
0 0
1 0
0
0 0
* * *
*
*
*
*
*
* *
i n N n
n
N
n
n
N
n
n
f nf
f nf
hh
f f f f
f
nf
nf nf f nf
f f
f
f nf
nf nf
nf
f nf
hh
nf
hh f m
nf
hh f nf m
i i i i i
i i i i i i
i i i i i i
i
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
2
2 2 1
2
2 2
;
;
;
;
;
#
a
a
a
a cr b f
a d i b
a d i b f
U
U
U
U
U
U U U
U U U U
=- - =
= -
- - + =
= + +
=
= +
=
=
=
= + + +
= + + + +
= + + + +
=
=
=
=
;
6
6
:
:
D
E D
@
@
(
(
2
2
Z
Z
/
/
 and 
, , , , ( , , )
( ) ( )
( )
( , , , )
( )
( )
( , , )
( , , , , )
( , , , , , , )
log
ln
ln
max
m x
D P P N
N
P P N
P
C C L X A U C C l
p Q C Q Y
p C w L L
Q f L X A
T L L
Y y L
h V C C l
h h A Y
D D A L Y
I X
y gr I X v
y gr I X
y
if y
if y
and
y if otherwise
y if y and y
1 1
0 0
1 0
0
0 0
* * *
*
*
*
*
*
* *
i n N n
n
N
n
n
N
n
n
f nf
f nf
hh
f f f f
f
nf
nf nf f nf
f f
f
f nf
nf nf
nf
f nf
hh
nf
hh f m
nf
hh f nf m
i i i i i
i i i i i i
i i i i i i
i
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
2
2 2 1
2
2 2
;
;
;
;
;
#
a
a
a
a cr b f
a d b
a d i b f
U
U
U
U
U U U
U U U U
=- - =
= -
- - + =
= + +
=
= +
=
=
=
= + + +
= + + + +
= + + +
=
=
=
=
;
6
6
:
:
D
E D
@
@
(
(
2
2
Z
Z
/
/
 are their observed counterparts, respectively. 
, , , , ( , , )
( ) ( )
( )
( , , , )
( )
( )
( , , )
( , , , , )
( , , , , , , )
log
ln
ln
max
max
D P P N
N
P P N
P
C C L X A U C C l
p Q C C Q Y
p C w L L
Q f L X A
T L L
Y y L
h V C C l
h h A Y
D D A L Y
I X
y gr I X v
y gr I X
y
if y
if y
and
y if otherwise
y if y and y
1 1
0 0
1 0
0
0 0
* * *
*
*
*
*
*
* *
i n N n
n
N
n
n
N
n
n
f nf
f nf
hh
f f f f
f
nf
nf nf f nf
f f
f
f nf
nf nf
nf
f nf
hh
nf
hh f m
nf
hh f nf m
i i i i i
i i i i i i
i i i i i i
i
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
2
2 2 1
2
2 2
;
;
;
;
;
#
a
a
a
a cr b f
a d i b
a d i b f
U
U
U
U
U
U U U
U U U U
=- - =
= -
- - + =
= + +
=
= +
=
=
=
= + + +
= + + + +
= + + + +
=
=
=
=
;
6
6
:
:
D
E D
@
@
(
(
2
2
Z
Z
/
/
 
represents the genialized residual from the reduced form 
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 are the error terms.
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diversifiers are 0.44% and 42%. The computed value of the 
CEI for 33% of the households is zero, indicating that they 
did not diversify (i.e. growing only one crop), whereas for 
52% of farms, the value of CEI is between 0.1 and 0.50, and 
for the remaining 15%, CEI falls between 0.50 and 0.82. The 
distribution of the THI is quite similar to that of CEI. 
Descriptive statistics show that there are a total of 22 
different crops grown throughout a typical agricultural year. 
However, food grains such as wheat, maize, barley, and rice 
are the major crops. On average, wheat accounts for about 
49.5% of the total value of revenue, followed by maize (12%), 
rice (11.42%), potato (5.5%) and onion (5.17%). High value 
crops such as fruits and vegetables occupy a smaller share 
of the total revenues. For illustration purposes, two differ-
ent measures of crop diversification CEI and Transformed 
Herfindahl index (THI) were constructed (Figure 1). About 
33% (equivalent to 2,830 out of 8,613) of the households 
grow one crop, 48% of the farmers grow two crops, 16.5% 
grow three crops, and about 3.5% grow four or more, with a 
sample average of 1.92 crops. 
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the variables used 
in the analysis. Average CEI and THI for the overall sample 
were calculated to be 29.5% and 28.3% with standard devia-
tion of 0.23, respectively, whereas mean CEI and THI among 
diversifiers are 0.44% and 42%. The computed value of the 
CEI for 33% of the households is zero, indicating that they 
did not diversify (i.e. growing only one crop), whereas for 
52% of farms, the value of CEI is between 0.1 and 0.50, and 
for the remaining 15%, CEI falls between 0.50 and 0.82. The 
distribution of the THI is quite similar to that of CEI. 
A considerable proportion (roughly 62%) of the sample 
households are engaged in off-farm activities, with a sample 
mean of 55K AFN of off-farm earnings per household. For 
households who actually have access to non-farm activities, 
noff-farm income is highly variable and ranges from a mini-
mum of 10K to a max of 480K AFN. Some farm households 
clearly have significant opportunities to transfer and spread 
risks to off-farm activities. 
Heterogeneity with respect to regional conditions may 
also largely affect the level of crop diversity. Rainfall 
throughout the year, yields, farm size, market infrastructure 
and conditions, and even cultural aspects may vary greatly 
Data, Summary Statistics, and 
Description of Variables
This study uses data from the Afghanistan Living Con-
dition Survey (ALCS) conducted by the Central Statistics 
Organisation (CSO) in 2013/14. Geographically, the survey 
covered all 34 provinces of the country. In total 35 strata 
were identified, 34 for the provinces of Afghanistan and 
one for the nomadic (Kuchi) population. Households were 
selected on the basis of a two-stage cluster design within 
each stratum. In the first stage Enumeration Areas (EAs) 
were selected as Primary Sampling Units (PSU’s) with prob-
ability proportional to Enumeration Area (EA) size. Subse-
quently, in the second stage ten households in each cluster 
were selected as the Ultimate Sampling Unit (USU). The 
data are representative at national and provincial level that 
covered about 157,262 persons within 20,786 households 
across the country. The survey was based on continuous data 
collection during a cycle of 12 months capturing important 
seasonal variations in a range of indicators including agricul-
ture. Using a structured questionnaire, data were collected 
on a number of indictors including agriculture production, 
household labour, assets, education, and other household 
level indicators.
Initial descriptive analysis of the data showed that roughly 
50% (about 9,642) households reported some engagement 
in agriculture. However, after accounting for missing values 
on key variables, the total number of usable observations 
reduced to 8,853 households. Furthermore, the sample of 
agricultural households was further investigated to examine 
if the household who only grow a single crop on a very small 
amount of land (i.e. backyard gardens) are systematically 
different from those who operate a relatively larger amount 
of land and grow major crops such as wheat, rice, cotton 
etc. Based on the t-test, the mean difference was found to 
be significant between these two categories, indicating that 
farmers who only produce garden crops may not be regular 
full-time farmers but may grow garden crops while under-
taking off-farm activities as their main occupation. These 
farmers were therefore excluded from the sample, reducing 
the sample from 8,853 to 8,613 households.
Descriptive statistics show that there are a total of 22 
different crops grown throughout a typical agricultural year. 
However, food grains such as wheat, maize, barley, and rice 
are the major crops. On average, wheat accounts for about 
49.5% of the total value of revenue, followed by maize (12%), 
rice (11.42%), potato (5.5%) and onion (5.17%). High value 
crops such as fruits and vegetables occupy a smaller share 
of the total revenues. For illustration purposes, two differ-
ent measures of crop diversification CEI and Transformed 
Herfindahl index (THI) were constructed (Figure 1). About 
33% (equivalent to 2,830 out of 8,613) of the households 
grow one crop, 48% of the farmers grow two crops, 16.5% 
grow three crops, and about 3.5% grow four or more, with a 
sample average of 1.92 crops. 
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the variables used 
in the analysis. Average CEI and THI for the overall sample 
were calculated to be 29.5% and 28.3% with standard devia-
tion of 0.23, respectively, whereas mean CEI and THI among 
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Figure 1: Distribution of Farms with respect to CEI & THI.
Source: own composition based on ALCS (2013-14) data
Hayatullah Ahmadzai
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by regions that may result in different levels of the extent of 
crop diversification. Based on the early work by Humlum 
(1959) revived by Dupree (1973), Afghanistan was divided 
into 11 geographical zones. However, a study by Maletta 
and Favre (2003) concluded that not all the 11 zones have 
agricultural significance (i.e. some zones were classified as 
deserts). Based on ecological properties of land and climate, 
and some supplementary criteria about accessibility and 
prevailing agricultural activities, Maletta and Favre (2003) 
adopted the 8 Agro-ecological Zones (AEZ) scheme which 
were constructed in the form of whole districts aggregations. 
Empirical Results and Discussion 
Based on Equations (11) and (12), the estimated average 
partial effects (APE) from the Cragg’s double hurdle model 
are reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 2, along with the 
results from the reduced form model (Equation 10) in col-
umn 4. For continuous variables, APE measures the change 
in probability of the observed , given a unit change of the 
independent variables, for discrete variables a change from 0 
to 1, holding all other variables constant.
It is unclear and difficult to distinguish between crop 
intensification or inter-cropping and crop diversification 
(although grains such as wheat, maize, barely, and rice 
occupy the absolute majority of the land which are highly 
unlikely to be inter-cropped). Thus, the CEI index (based on 
crop revenue shares and weighted by the number of crops) is 
likely to better fit our data as compared to the binary variable 
(to diversify or not), as it may fail to distinguish between 
intensification and diversification. However, as an additional 
robustness check to test the econometric specification, we 
ran instrumental variable Tobit (IVTobit) and instrumental 
variable Probit (IVProbit) models to test the possibility that 
the decisions to diversify and on the extent of diversifica-
tion are perhaps made simultaneously. Estimated results 
from both models (presented in Annex 1) are qualitatively 
Table 1: Summary statistics for variables used in the analysis.
Variable Mean SD Min Max
Dependent Variable
Composite Entropy Index (0≤CEI≤1) 0.295 0.233 0.000  0.830 
Transformed Herfindahl Index (0≤THI≤1) 0.283 0.232 0.000  0.830 
Explanatory Variables
Off-farm Income (in 10,000 AFN) 5.519 11.05 0.000  480.0 
Total Land (Ha) 1.564 4.227 0.020  211.2 
Transport Equipment (1=access, 0=otherwise) 0.450 0.498 0.000  1.000 
Communication Equipment (1=access, 0=otherwise) 0.798 0.402 0.000  1.000 
Cattle Ownership (N) 1.477 1.943 0.000  31.00 
Oxen & Yaks (N) 0.248 0.635 0.000  9.000 
Tractor & Thresher (N) 0.052 0.231 0.000  4.000 
Land Quality (1= irrigated agriculture, 0=irrigated & rainfed) 0.437 0.496 0.000  1.000 
Landscape (1=open plain, 0=hills & valleys) 0.753 0.431 0.000  1.000 
Sufficient Irrigation Water (1=access, 0=otherwise) 0.448 0.497 0.000  1.000 
Household Size (persons) 8.124 3.474 1.000  36.00 
Head Edu: No Formal Schooling (0=yes) 0.769 0.422 0.000  1.000 
Head Edu: Primary & Lower sec (1=yes) 0.116 0.320 0.000  1.000 
Head Edu: Upper Secondary (2=yes) 0.079 0.270 0.000  1.000 
Head Edu: Teacher College (3=yes) 0.023 0.150 0.000  1.000 
Head Edu: Uni & Postgrad (4=yes) 0.013 0.115 0.000  1.000 
Household Head Sex (0=F, 1=M) 0.995 0.067 0.000  1.000 
Household Head Age (Years) 44.11 13.90 13.000  98.00 
Extension Services (1=access, 0=otherwise) 0.184 0.387 0.000  1.000 
Distance to Nearest Road (km) 2.513 8.876 0.000  100.0 
Distance to Market (0=Not reachable) 0.044 0.204 0.000  1.000 
Distance to Market (1=Less than 1h) 0.548 0.498 0.000  1.000 
Distance to Market (2=More than 1h) 0.408 0.492 0.000  1.000 
AEZ 1: (1=North Eastern Mountains-NEM) 0.023 0.151 0.000  1.000 
AEZ 2 (2=Central Mountains-CM) 0.166 0.372 0.000  1.000 
AEZ 3: (1=Helmand Farah Lowlands-HFL) 0.040 0.197 0.000  1.000 
AEZ 4: (1=Southern Mountains and Foothills-SMF) 0.198 0.399 0.000  1.000 
AEZ 5: (5=Helmand Valley & Sistan Basins-HVSB) 0.105 0.306 0.000  1.000 
AEZ 6: (6=Turkistan Plains-TP) 0.068 0.252 0.000  1.000 
AEZ 7: (7=Northern Mountains & Foothills-NMF) 0.183 0.387 0.000  1.000 
AEZ 8: (8=Eastern Mountains & Foothills-EMF) 0.216 0.412 0.000  1.000 
Instruments 
IV1-Share of off-farm income in total Income within District 0.519 0.294 0.000  1.000 
IV2-Lag District Level off-farm income 2011/12 (10K AFN) 507.6 568.1 11.975  9,090 
           N 8,613
Source: own composition based on ALCS (2013-14) data
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and quantitatively similar to those of our main results, we 
therefore stick to the estimations from the preferred Cragg’s 
type hurdle model because IVTobit is restrictive (in the sense 
that both decisions are governed by the same process) and 
IVProbit fails to distinguish between crop diversification and 
intensification. 
The reduced-form model (Equation 11) was estimated 
using OLS and presented as the reduced form stage esti-
mates in Table 2. All instrumental variables had the expected 
significant impact on the endogenous variables. They satisfy 
the orthogonality conditions, implying that IVs are directly 
and significantly correlated with the endogenous variables 
but affect dependent variables in the structural models only 
through the inclusion of the computed generalised residu-
als from the reduced form. It is plausible to believe that any 
leftover endogeneity after using the CF approach will be 
uncorrelated with the other covariates in the structural model 
(Ricker-Gilbert et al., 2011).
Endogeneity in off-farm income was investigated by 
applying the Wald test of exogeneity. The calculated test sta-
tistic is 142.49 and rejects the null hypothesis of no endogene-
ity in off-farm income at 1% significance level conditional on 
the validity of instruments. The Amemiya-Lee-Newey over-
identification test estimator was used to test the null hypothe-
sis that the instruments are jointly valid, and that the excluded 
instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equa-
tion. The result of Amemiya-Lee-Newey1 is insignificant, thus 
establishing the validity of the instruments. Variance Inflation 
Factor (VIF) was used to test for multicollinearity, the mean 
value of VIF was less than 10 (2.85) rejecting the possibility 
of potential multicollinearity in the data.
1 Additionally, a set of minimum distance version weak-instrument-robust tests 
including Anderson-Rubin (AR), Conditional Likelihood Ratio (CLR), the Lagrange 
Multiplier (LM), overidentification (J), and a combination of the LM and J over iden-
tification (K-J) suggested by Finlay and Magnusson (2009) were also carried out. The 
confidence intervals for the off-farm income coefficient produced by the weak-instru-
ment tests were not wider than the non-robust Wald confidence intervals, indicating 
that instruments are strong and that point estimates are robust to weak instrument bias.
Table 2: Estimations of diversification decisions using Cragg’s type double hurdle model.
 
VARIABLES Reduced form
Hurdle 1 Hurdle 2
Decision to diversify Extent of diversification 
Generalised residual - - -0.028*** (0.002) -0.009*** (0.001)
Off-farm income (10K) - - -0.002*** (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000)
total land (ha) -0.062** (0.027)  0.022*** (0.002)  0.002*** (0.000)
transport equip (1=access)  0.926*** (0.251)  0.043*** (0.011)  0.019*** (0.004)
Communication equip (1=access)  0.394 (0.298)  0.031** (0.013)  0.018*** (0.005)
Ownership of cattle (N) -0.144** (0.060)  0.005* (0.003)  0.003*** (0.001)
Ownership of oxen (N) -0.685*** (0.191)  0.042*** (0.009)  0.017*** (0.003)
Ownership of tractor (N)  0.522 (0.503)  0.132*** (0.027)  0.030*** (0.008)
Land quality (1=good) -0.288 (0.341)  0.100*** (0.015)  0.036*** (0.005)
Landscape (1=open plain)  0.806*** (0.268)  0.145*** (0.011)  0.045*** (0.004)
Access to irrigation (1=access)  0.469** (0.235)  0.045*** (0.010)  0.020*** (0.004)
HH size (persons)  0.589*** (0.035)  0.025*** (0.002)  0.009*** (0.001)
Head edu. (1=primary & sec)  1.378*** (0.351)  0.081*** (0.015)  0.026*** (0.006)
Head edu (2=upper sec)  3.572*** (0.420)  0.168*** (0.016)  0.055*** (0.008)
Head edu. (3=teacher college)  2.103*** (0.737)  0.092*** (0.031)  0.025** (0.012)
Head edu. (4=uni & grad)  6.757*** (0.954)  0.195*** (0.031)  0.078*** (0.018)
HH head sex (1=male) -0.049 (1.620)  0.104 (0.075)  0.044* (0.023)
HH head age (years)  0.002 (0.008)  0.001 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)
Extension service (1=access) -1.123*** (0.295) -0.018 (0.013) -0.013*** (0.005)
Distance to road (km) -0.022* (0.013)  0.000 (0.001)  0.001* (0.000)
Distance to market (1=< 1h)  0.262  (0.564)  0.030 (0.025)  0.020** (0.009)
Distance to market (2=>1h) -0.448 (0.553)  0.022 (0.024)  0.006 (0.008)
AEZ 1 (CM) -0.922 (0.769)  0.124*** (0.036)  0.013 (0.011)
AEZ 2 (HFL)  1.011 (0.929) -0.033 (0.043) -0.028** (0.013)
AEZ 3 (SMF)  1.273 (0.787)  0.304*** (0.036)  0.068*** (0.012)
AEZ 4 (HVSB) -0.842 (0.881) -0.153*** (0.041) -0.040*** (0.012)
AEZ 5 (TP) -0.562 (0.869) -0.077* (0.041) -0.056*** (0.012)
AEZ 6 (NMF) -0.804 (0.775)  0.132*** (0.037)  0.031*** (0.011)
AEZ 7 (EMF) -1.096 (0.779)  0.261*** (0.036)  0.110*** (0.012)
IV1 10.612*** (0.485) - - - -
IV2  0.001*** (0.000) - - - -
Constant -5.833*** 1.881 - - - -
R-squared 0.179     
Pseudo R-square  0.113
Observations 8,613   8,613  8,613  
Standard errors are in parenthesis. Significance is indicated by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: own composition based on ALCS (2013-14) data
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Estimated average partial effects illustrate negative and 
significant impact of household non-farm income on the 
decision to diversify and the extent of crop diversification. 
Holding other variables constant, an increase of 10,000 
Afghani in off-farm income (equivalent to almost 20% of the 
sample mean for off-farm income) decreases the likelihood 
to diversify by 0.2 percent points and decreases the extent 
of diversification by 0.1 percent points. This is consistent 
with the hypothesis that allocation of farm labour away to 
off-farm activities decreases diversity, possibly due to nega-
tive labour effects, or perhaps because the opportunity cost 
of farm labour is higher than off-farm rural wages, probably 
due to market imperfections. Our findings of negative impact 
of off-farm income are consistent with the conclusions of 
earlier studies including Weiss and Briglauer (2000), and 
Mishra et al. (2004) but are in contrast with Cavatassi et al. 
(2012).
Holding all variables at their mean, an increase in land 
(i.e. total land cultivated by farm household) by one hectare 
increases the chances of crop diversification by 2.2 percent-
age points and extent of diversification by 0.2 percent points. 
The positive effect of land size indicates that households with 
a relatively larger land size have the flexibility to allocate 
land among a variety of crops and therefore diversify. These 
findings are consistent with those of Hitayezu et al. (2016) 
for South Africa, and McNamara and Weiss (2005) for Aus-
tria. However, Pope and Prescott (1980) found a positive and 
quadratic relationship between farm size and diversity argu-
ing that there is a trade-off between scale economies and risk 
reduction. That is, if there are large-scale economies in an 
enterprise, then one might expect larger farms to be more 
specialised. 
Farm households living in communities with better access 
to roads maintain higher crop diversity. Improved access 
implies better access to market information on demand and 
prices and lower transaction costs due to better market infra-
structure, transport and storage facilities. Moreover, high-value 
horticultural crops such as vegetables and fruits are perishable 
and require sustained supply chain in order for the households 
to sell them in local markets. Rao et al. (2008) finds a sig-
nificant and positive impact of road density on diversification 
towards high value horticultural crops in India. Turner (2014) 
indicated that Mozambican farmers lacking access to transport 
infrastructure do not allocate land to marketable cash crops. 
Ownership of transport equipment by the households and 
access to communication equipment (i.e. television, mobile 
phone, and radio) were also found to have a significant and 
positive influence on the extent of crop diversity. This further 
supports the argument that these communication equipment 
provide better access to market information and ownership of 
transport equipment introduces efficiency to the cost function 
through low-cost means of transport. 
Households with greater number of livestock (cattle and 
oxen) maintain higher level of crop diversity. Our findings 
agree with Benin et al. (2004) and Cavatassi et al. (2012) 
that pointed out that owners of oxen tend to plant greater 
number of crops perhaps due the mechanical power provided 
by the oxen. Similarly, ownership of cattle herds increases 
the amount of manure produced at the farm that enhances 
soil fertility through adding organic materials to the soil. 
Farm households that own tractors maintain higher degree of 
diversity enable households to utilise lands more efficiently 
and increases production efficiency through availability of 
cheaper and timely traction power. 
Agricultural extension services appear to have a signifi-
cant negative impact on the extent of crop diversification. 
This is perhaps due to the policy emphasis on achieving 
self-sufficiency in producing staple grain food crops. While 
grain, particularly wheat, is the major source of nutrition, 
Afghanistan still imports a substantial quantity of wheat 
flour so there is an aim to produce more grains domestically. 
Mesfin et al. (2011) arrives at a similar conclusion arguing 
that the negative impact of extension services is associated 
with the extension system favouring specialisation at macro 
level and overlooks the role of crop diversification in risk 
minimisation. 
There appears to be a significant and positive relationship 
between land type and CD. Farmers operating on irrigated 
agriculture alone are significantly more diversified than their 
counterparts who operate a combination of irrigated and 
rain-fed land. In addition, farms with stable access to suffi-
cient irrigation water (in irrigated lands) throughout the year 
appear to be more diversified. Afghanistan is a dry country 
and farmers often don’t have access to sufficient irrigation 
water during the year. As a result, farmers are restricted to 
grow limited number of crops, particularly since many veg-
etables require greater amount of irrigation. Mesfin et al. 
(2011) confirms that irrigation intensity has a positive effect 
on crop diversity by enabling farmers to grow vegetables 
along other grains. 
Farmers operating in the plains or on flat lands diver-
sify more in comparison to farmers with land in valleys and 
hills. Altitude and slope of land effects physical conditions 
of farming which translates into the household decisions on 
the number and type of crops they choose to grow. Cavatassi 
et al. (2012) indicated that variability in slope of the farm-
land leads to greater variability in diversity. Our results are 
in contrast of those of Van Dusen and Taylor (2005) who 
found that Mexican farms located in areas with steep slope 
are more diversified. 
We controlled for eight agroecological regions: Eastern 
Mountains and Foothills (EMF), Southern Mountain and 
Foothills (SMF), and Central Mountains (CM) were the most 
favourable for crop diversification compared to the refer-
ence zone (NEM). Among other heterogeneous unobserved 
effects such as climatic, physical conditions, and cultural 
conditions, the level to off-farm employment/income, access 
to farmland, market development infrastructure and market 
conditions, and road density are expected to greatly vary 
from region to region. Figure 2 illustrates spatial variation 
in crop diversification at the district level across the country.
Highly diversified areas are indicated by darker shades 
(CEI=0.36-0.67), and the least diversified districts with 
lighter shades (CEI= 0-0.17), whereas the grey areas repre-
sent areas with no data. These areas are either areas with 
no agricultural significance (i.e. deserts and mountains) or 
could not be covered by the survey. In addition, these areas 
may represent the households that were surveyed but did not 
report any involvement in agriculture activities (i.e. house-
holds that did not report crop production).
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Composite Entropy Index (                  )0    CEI    1
(0.36-0.67)
(0.27-0.36)
(0.17-0.27)
(0.0-0.17)
No Data
Figure 2: Map of CD at District Level.
Source: own composition based on ALCS (2013-14) data
Robustness Checks
Cultivation of opium poppy is an important aspect of 
farming in the context of Afghanistan that may generate 
systematic differences in household characteristics and their 
management strategies (e.g. crop diversification) across the 
regions, especially since opium poppy cultivation is rela-
tively more common in some zones or provinces than others. 
Using information from Afghanistan’s Ministry of Coun-
ter Narcotics (MCN) on major poppy producing areas, we 
divided our analytical sample into two sub-samples based 
on the intensity of poppy cultivation at the provincial level: 
1) Households in main opium producing provinces were 
assigned in one category, and 2) Households in other prov-
inces that were opium free according to the MCN report 
published in 2013 were assigned to another category. Sub-
sequently, we ran our analysis for each category separately, 
aiming to investigate the extent to which crop diversification 
and other household socioeconomic characteristics can dif-
fer between opium infected and opium free areas/provinces. 
Our results from the two sub-samples suggest no dra-
matic qualitative differences in the estimates among the two 
sub-groups, although there are some quantitative differences 
in the estimated parameters. Off-farm income is consistently 
significant and negatively associated with the level of crop 
diversification in all models. The major disparity in the esti-
mated parameters among two groups is that crop diversifica-
tion is lower in major poppy producing agroecological zones 
(AEZ) such as Helmand Valley and Sistan Basin (HVSB), 
Heart-Farah Low Lands (HFL), and Central Mountains 
(CM), perhaps farm households specialize in opium pro-
duction in these areas due to the extra income from poppy 
cultivation.
Proximity to or remoteness from urban centres is another 
critical aspect in the context of this study, a factor that may 
alter the crop diversification strategies adopted by farmers. 
While the narrative central to the analysis presented in this 
paper pursues the theory that marketisation increases crop 
diversification, a concern may arise that market orientation 
may actually motivate farmers to engage in production of 
specialised crops, since marketisation may offer competitive 
advantages for certain agricultural commodities. Conversely, 
subsistence farmers in remote areas may engage in crop diver-
sification, so as to be able to meet their dietary requirement 
from their own production, given that their access to markets 
is limited. In the meantime, consistent with the narrative of 
marketisation-diversification assumed by this paper, if close-
ness to urbanisation or marketisation truly increases crop 
diversification, then it could be the case that farm households 
close to urban centres are probably diversifying way more 
than those located in remote areas with less access to mar-
kets, giving rise to potentially significant differences across 
households. In both the “marketisation-specialisation” and 
“marketisation-diversification” scenarios, it was important to 
carry out a robustness check to ensure that our main results 
were not driven by this spatial aspect of farming.
We therefore ran a further robustness check and split our 
analytical sample into two sub-groups: farm households situ-
ated within 1 our 2 hours from or to the main urban centres 
were assigned to one group and farms located in remote areas 
Hayatullah Ahmadzai
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Appendix
ANNEX I. IVTobit and IVProbit estimations for joint crop diversification decisions  
Table 3: Unconditional Marginal Effects from the IVTobit and IVProbit models. 
Variable 1st Stage IVTobit IVProbitCoefficient SE ME SE ME SE
Off-farm Income (in 10K AFN) - - -0.015*** 0.001 -0.070*** 0.009
Total Land (ha) -0.062** 0.027 0.003*** 0.001 0.052*** 0.015
Transport Equip. (1=access) 0.926*** 0.251 0.031*** 0.007 0.102*** 0.031
Communication Equip (1=yes) 0.394 0.298 0.026*** 0.008 0.071** 0.034
Cattle Ownership (N) -0.144** 0.060 0.004** 0.002 0.012 0.008
Oxen & Yaks (N) -0.685*** 0.191 0.024*** 0.005 0.099*** 0.025
Tractor & Thresher (N) 0.522 0.503 0.051*** 0.013 0.311*** 0.082
Land Quality (1=good) -0.288 0.341 0.050*** 0.009 0.226*** 0.042
Landscape (1=open plain) 0.806*** 0.268 0.064*** 0.007 0.344*** 0.035
Irrigation Water (1=access) 0.469** 0.235 0.029*** 0.006 0.106*** 0.029
Household Size (persons) 0.589*** 0.035 0.014*** 0.001 0.060*** 0.010
Head Edu (1=primary & sec) 1.378*** 0.351 0.041*** 0.01 0.194*** 0.047
Head Edu (2=upper sec) 3.572*** 0.420 0.088*** 0.013 0.435*** 0.058
Head Edu (3=teacher college) 2.103*** 0.737 0.042** 0.021 0.222*** 0.083
Head Edu (4=uni & grad) 6.757*** 0.954 0.128*** 0.031 0.523*** 0.145
Head Sex (1=male) -0.049 1.620 0.080** 0.04 0.232 0.176
Head Age (years) 0.002 0.008 0.0002 0.00 0.001 0.001
Extension Services (1=access) -1.123*** 0.295 -0.017** 0.008 -0.043 0.035
Distance to Road (km) -0.022* 0.013 -0.005*** 0.001 0.001 0.002
Distance to Market (1=< 1h) 0.262 0.564 0.030** 0.015 0.069 0.057
Distance to Market (2=>1h) -0.448 0.553 0.016 0.015 0.051 0.055
AEZ 2 (CM) -0.922 0.769 0.041** 0.00 0.267*** 0.087
AEZ 3 (HFL) 1.011 0.929 -0.023 0.023 -0.069 0.147
AEZ 4 (SMF) 1.273 0.787 0.130*** 0.02 0.732*** 0.094
AEZ 5 (HVSB) -0.842 0.881 -0.049** 0.022 -0.328*** 0.108
AEZ 6 (TP) -0.562 0.869 -0.059*** 0.021 -0.162 0.101
AEZ 7 (NMF) -0.804 0.775 0.065*** 0.02 0.284*** 0.088
AEZ 8 (EMF) -1.096 0.779 0.162*** 0.02 0.604*** 0.096
IV1- Share of Off-farm Income in Total Income within District 10.612*** 0.485 - - - -
IV2-Lag District Level OFY 0.001*** 0.000 - - - -
Constant -5.833*** 1.881 - - - -
Log-Likelihood -32,065.16 -35,949.00 -36,900.66
Wald Test of exogeneity (chi2, p-value) - - 142.25*** 0.000 96.22*** 0.000
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Notes: Marginal Effects for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level significance levels indicated by * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010.  
Source: own composition based on ALCS (2013-14) data
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